Iowa Supreme Court upholds grooming policy prohibiting male earrings

A male employee fired for wearing an earring could not sue for sex discrimination, even though female workers were alllowed to wear such jewelry, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled in Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc. (12/17/03).

Obviously the policy discriminates on the basis of sex ! But the catch is that jewelry restrictions and other similar aspects of dress codes are not viewed as having significant enough impact on the employment experience. Not all discrimination is remediable (what a shocking thought — how midwestern and conservative ! I love it !).

The court explained (I’m leaving the cites in for any research freaks reading this):

[T]he federal courts which have examined Title VII’s legislative history have found personal grooming codes that reflect customary modes of grooming having only an insignificant impact on employment opportunities do not constitute sex discrimination within the meaning of the Act. See, e.g., Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401–02 (6th Cir. 1977); Knott, 527 F.2d at 1252; Dodge, 488 F.2d at 1337.

Several federal appellate courts have considered Title VII in the context of personal grooming codes regulating hair length. Every federal appellate court which has considered personal grooming codes prohibiting men but not women from wearing long hair has found the codes to be non-discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII. See Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996); Barker, 549 F.2d at 401; Earwood v. Cont’l Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976); Knott, 527 F.2d at 1252; Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1974); Dodge, 448 F.2d at 1337; Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

We agree with these decisions and their reasoning. The sex discrimination provisions of Title VII and the ICRA were enacted to stop the perpetuation of sexist or chauvinistic attitudes in employment which significantly affect employment opportunities. Title VII and the ICRA were not meant to prohibit employers from instituting personal grooming codes which have a de minimus affect on employment.