Supreme Court Upholds Time Limits on Title VII Pay Discrimination Cases in 5-4 Decision

In a 5-4 decision that roused the ire of dissenting Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Supreme Court said employees claiming intentional pay discrimination under Title VII must do so within 180 days of the original discriminatory action — not 180 days of their last paycheck.

The decision on Wednesday [May 29, 2007] in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. made it easier for employers to defend against Title VII workplace discrimination claims based on long-ago decisions about salary and raises.

The Court ruled that Lilly Ledbetter, the lone female supervisor at a tire plant in Gadsden, Ala., did not file her lawsuit against Goodyear in the timely manner specified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Some Background

Ledbetter contended that over the course of her employment with Goodyear from 1979 to 1998:

• Several supervisors gave her poor evaluations because of her sex.
• As a result, her pay had not increased as much as if she had been evaluated fairly.
• Those past pay decisions affected the amount of her pay throughout her employment.
• By the end of her employment, she was earning significantly less than her male colleagues.

Hmm . . . I wonder if Ledbetter may have actually “led better” as a supervisor, but didn’t get any raises because she was a woman. We’ll never know . . . but I can bet this isn’t a very “good year” for her.

The Statute

Title VII plainly requires that before filing suit, an individual complaining of discrimination must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 or 300 days (depending on the State) after “the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.”

Ruling Below and Issue at Supreme Court

In Ledbetter’s case, after she won at trial, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. It found insufficient evidence that Goodyear acted with discriminatory intent in making the only two pay decisions (denials of raises) that occurred within 180 days before Ledbetter filed her charge.

Ledbetter did not challenge this finding before the Supreme Court, but sought review of the following question:

Whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging illegal pay discrimination when the disparate pay is received during the statutory limitations period, but is the result of intentionally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the limitations period.

The Decision

The Court essentially held the answer is “never.”

Justice Alito, in the majority opinion, reasoned that previous Supreme Court decisions held that the time for filing an EEOC charge begins when the discriminatory act occurs, and that “this rule applies to any discrete act of discrimination.” “Because a pay-setting decision is a ‘discrete act,’ it follows that the period for filing an EEOC charge begins when [that] act occurs.”

The majority opinion continues:

Ledbetter asserted disparate treatment, the central element of which is discriminatory intent. However, Ledbetter does not assert that the relevant Goodyear decisionmakers acted with actual discriminatory intent either when they issued her checks during the EEOC charging period or when they denied her a raise in 1998. Rather, she argues that the paychecks were unlawful because they would have been larger if she had been evaluated in a nondiscriminatory manner prior to the EEOC charging period.

Similarly, she maintains that the 1998 decision was unlawful because it “carried forward” the effects of prior, uncharged discrimination decisions. In essence, she suggests that it is sufficient that discriminatory acts that occurred prior to the charging period had continuing effects during that period. . . . This argument is squarely foreclosed by our precedents.

After discussing these precedents, the Alito opinion concludes:

The EEOC charging period is triggered when a discrete unlawful practice takes place. A new violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting from the past discrimination. But of course, if an employer engages in a series of acts each of which is intentionally discriminatory, then a fresh violation takes place when each act is committed.

The Dissent

Much media attention has been focused on Ginsburg’s biting dissent, which charges that “the court does not comprehend, or is indifferent to, the insidious way in which women can be victims of pay discrimination.” She explained that a woman may not be aware of others’ salaries when she first joins a company, and she “understandably may be anxious to avoid making waves” at her new workplace.

Ginsburg, the Court’s only female justice, underscored her disapproval by reading her dissent from the bench — a rare practice.

The Court’s decision, including the dissenting opinion, can be read in full here: (Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (2007)).

See also:

• Washington Post: “Over Ginsburg’s Dissent, Court Limits Bias Suits”
• Washington Post: Discussion Transcript, “Supreme Court Upholds Limits for Pay Bias Lawsuits”
• Legal Times: “Supreme Court Limits Time Frame for Filing EEOC Claims”

George will be back within a few days to write about this case, analyzing its significance, noting some of the expert commentary, and — of course — throwing in his own “expert” commentary and filling in all the nuances missed by the mainstream media.

You have 180 days, George. The clock is ticking.

Thanks to Patty 74_99 for the photo.

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