The Supreme Court has ruled that government employees who complain of unfair or arbitrary workplace treatment that is inconsistent with treatment of other employees in similar circumstances may not maintain a claim under the Constitution’s equal protection clause, — unless the mistreatment is due to discrimination on the basis of race, sex or another protected category.
The question in this case is whether a public employee can state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that she was arbitrarily treated differently from other similarly situated employees, with no assertion that the different treatment was based on the employee’s membership in any particular class.
We hold that such a “class-of-one” theory of equal protection has no place in the public employment context.
Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, No. 07-474 (June 9, 2008).
The claim at issue was distinct from the race, sex, and national origin claims unsuccessfully brought by the same employee. It was simply that she had been terminated for “arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious reasons.”
In “Justices Reject ‘Class of One’ Argument,” Ms Greenhouse explains:
A cryptic Supreme Court decision eight years ago had accepted the theory that an individual can comprise a “class of one” for equal protection purposes and can sue a government agency for mistreatment that has no objectively rational explanation.
That case concerned a zoning decision . . . in which one homeowner was required to give a 33-foot easement . . . to the public water supply, while . . . neighbors were assessed only 15 feet. Such “irrational and wholly arbitrary treatment” could be the basis for an equal protection case, the court said then in a unanimous, unsigned opinion.
That decision, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, appeared to mark a new departure in equal protection doctrine. But at only five paragraphs long, it did not begin to cover the landscape. The question soon arose whether the principle it announced applied to government employment as well as to government regulation. Nearly every federal appeals court to consider that question answered yes, but on Monday the Supreme Court said no.
The “class-of-one theory of equal protection” was “simply a poor fit in the public employment context,” Chief Justice Roberts said [in Engquist], explaining that the government needed “broad discretion” to make “subjective and individualized” decisions concerning its work force.
“To treat employees differently is not to classify them in a way that raises equal protection concerns,” the chief justice said, adding: “A challenge that one has been treated individually in this context, instead of like everyone else, is a challenge to the underlying nature of the government action.”
In a dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens objected that the majority “carves a novel exception out of state employees’ constitutional rights.” There is a “clear distinction between an exercise of discretion and an arbitrary decision,” he said.
The Equal Protection Clause protects people against “unequal and irrational treatment at the hands of the state,” Justice Stevens continued. He said that “even if some surgery were truly necessary to prevent governments from being forced to defend a multitude of equal protection ‘class of one’ claims, the court should use a scalpel rather than a meat-axe.” Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined the dissent.
* * *
Ms. Engquist’s Supreme Court appeal attracted considerable attention. A brief filed by a coalition of gay rights and disability rights groups maintained that the class-of-one theory of equal protection was particularly important for groups like theirs, which in contrast to groups defined by race, religion, sex or national origin have not been accorded specially protected status by the court.
The close relationship between the employer and employee, and the varied needs and interests involved in the employment context, mean that considerations such as concerns over personality conflicts that would be unreasonable as grounds for “arm’s-length” government decisions (e.g., zoning, licensing) may well justify different treatment of a public employee.
Unlike the context of arm’s-length regulation, . . . treating seemingly similarly situated individuals differently in the employment context is par for the course.
Thus, the class-of-one theory of equal protection . . . is simply a poor fit in the public employment context. To treat employees differently is not to classify them in a way that raises equal protection concerns. Rather, it is simply to exercise the broad discretion that typically characterizes the employer-employee relationship.
However — a big “however” — the fact the employer treated similarly situated employees differently (if a pattern based on a protected classification emerges), or otherwise acted unfairly or arbitrarily, may allow the employee to circumstantially prove discrimination. Indeed, some variation of this theme is the most common method of doing so.
Sphere: Related ContentIf you enjoyed this post, please consider leaving a comment or subscribing.
Subscribe by RSS
Subscribe by Email
Comments
No comments yet.
Leave a comment